DOGMATIC FOUNDATION FOR THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF COLLECTIVE PERSONS

Abstract

Criminal Law also limits its punishment to legal persons, requiring the existence of collective legal personality as a prerequisite for criminal liability. However, there is doctrine that defends the non-requirement of legal personality for collective entities, so that they can be held legally and criminally responsible. According to Rocha, referring to Germano Marques da Silva, “legal personality does not fully capture the “criminal personality” of collective entities”, noting however that “this is not about reintroducing criminal “responsibility” for things, not even for hold collectively responsible all people who come together to achieve a collective interest” In effect, when we assume that the subject subject to criminal punishment does not lack legal

1.Pessoas colectivas de direito privado ersonality, it becomes unequivocal that the concept of legal person given by Civil Law does not exhaust the fullness of the active subject foreseen for Criminal Law, in the sense in which it is broader. This is why, for terminological rigor, throughout our work we will use, to define the active agent in question, the expressions: collective entity, legal entity , moral person? Legal person and similar and collective reality. The important question to ask is whether all collective entities should have the same relevance to Criminal Law.