GAME THEORY AS A STRATEGIC TOOL FOR THE DEFENSE IN PLEA BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS

Abstract

The plea bargaining mechanism, formally regulated by Brazilian Law No. 12.850/2013, has become a relevant legal tool in the fight against organized crime. However, its practical application raises critical challenges for the defense, especially due to the structural imbalance between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the defendant, which may undermine fairness, transparency, and fundamental rights. In this context, Game Theory—an analytical tool from applied mathematics—offers models capable of interpreting strategic interactions between rational agents, contributing to the development of defense strategies in criminal proceedings. This study aims to analyze how the application of Game Theory to plea negotiations can promote balance between prosecution and defense, leading to fairer and more effective agreements in accordance with due process of law. The research adopts a qualitative, exploratory, and descriptive approach, based on bibliographic review and normative analysis. The findings demonstrate that strategic rationality—expressed through concepts such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium—enables the defense to anticipate prosecutorial strategies, assess risks, and maximize benefits, thereby enhancing both the protection of the defendant’s rights and the efficiency of the criminal justice system.